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RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
ARTICLE 2"
Lisa M. Hitch"
Article 4 of the February 24, 1988 Working Group
Draft of the Convention on the Rights of the Child purported
to extend all the rights set forth in the Convention to each
individual child. The Article specifically provided these rights
"[w]ithout distinction of any kind, irrespective of the child's or
his parent's or legal guardian's race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
family status, ethnic origin, cultural beliefs or practices,
property, educational attainment, birth, or any other basis
whatever."1
The Working Group of government representatives
charged by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights
with drafting the Convention on the Rights of the Child has
since finished the second reading of this Convention. On
December 20, 1988, the working group presented its final
The Comments are made in the author's personal capacity. The views expressed
herein are solely of the author.
.. B.A. (Hons), 1979, Queens College; LL.B.; Legal Officer, Human Rights Law
Section, Department of Justice, Canada; Member of the Executive of the National Capital
Branch of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs.
1. The entire text of draft Article 4 reads as follows:
1. The States Parties to the present Convention shall respect and extend
all the rights set forth in this Convention to each child in their territories
without distinction of any kind, irrespective of the child's or his parent's
or legal guardian's race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, family status, ethnic origin, cultural
beliefs or practices, property, educational attainment, birth or any other
basis whatever.
2. States Parties to the present Convention shall take all appropriate
measures to ensure that the child is protected against all forms of
discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status, activities,
expressed opinions, or beliefs of the child's parents, legal guardians, or
other family members.
Question of a Convention on the Rights of the Child; Report of the Working Group on a draft
convention on the rights of the child, 45 U.N. ESCOR (Agenda Item 13) , U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1989/48 (1989) [hereinafter Working Group Report].
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draft which amended some of the wording in the previously
published articles, as well as renumbering and, in some cases,
reordering them. This version, which will be presented to the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights for debate in
February or March of 1989, somewhat changed the wording
of Article 4 and renumbered it as Article 2.2 This comment
will discuss the earlier version of the Working Group Draft
and comment on the effect, if any, of the new wording
reflected in Article 2 of the December, 1988 version.
The principle of equality or non-discrimination codified
in Article 2 is a recurring theme in international law and is
contained in many international human rights instruments such
as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,3 the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights4 and the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.'
However, as one international judge has noted, "[a]lthough
the existence of this principle is universally recognized ... its
precise content is not very clear."6  Historically, this clause
exemplifies one of the most basic problems in the internation-
al law of human rights.
2. The new wording of Article 2 of the draft convention is as follows:
1. The States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in this
Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination
of any kind, irrespective of the child's or his or her parent's or legal
guardian's race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status.
2. The States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that
the child is protected against all forms of discrimination or punishment
on the basis of the status, activities, expressed opinions, or beliefs of the
child's parents, legal guardians, or family members.
Working Group Report, supra note 1, at 29. Since this paper was written, the Convention has
been adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on November 20, 1989 (U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/44/L.44) in the form of draft Article 2 above.
3. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948)
[hereinafter UDHR].
4. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
5. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter
ICESCR].
6. South West Africa, Second Phase, 1966 I.C.J. 6.
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I. INTERNATIONAL NORMS AGAINST DISCRIMINATION
International human rights law developed as a limited
exception to the doctrine of national sovereignty.7 This was
in response to several historical situations "[w]here a State
committed atrocities against its own subjects which 'shocked
the conscience of mankind'."'
The outrage of the world community led to internation-
al law that would obviate the possibility of similar events ever
occurring again. The first instrument effected toward this goal
was the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,9 which
cataloged many basic human rights and fundamental freedoms
already accepted as the foundations of many national constitu-
tions. This document, in effect, became the basis and
standard for human rights law in the international sphere and
was quickly followed by a number of other instruments such
as the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or
Belief1° and the Proclamation of Teheran." The result, as
7. See generally P. SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 13-17 (1983)
(for an account of the development of international human rights law).
8. Shortly following the First World War, the first treaties were signed dealing with the
new States created by the Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain. These treaties were
intended to protect the rights of linguistic and ethnic minorities and, for the first time,
specifically included such rights as the right to life, liberty, free exercise of religion, and equal
treatment before the law.
At the same time, international agreements were beginning to address several other
humanitarian concerns which started to infringe on matters previously considered within the
exclusive right of the individual State under the doctrine of national sovereignty. These
concerns included slavery, treatment of prisoners of war, and adequate working conditions.
The Slavery Convention, often seen as the first true international human rights treaty, was
adopted in 1926. Slavery Convention, Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, T.S. No. 778, 60 L.N.T.S.
253. However, the greatest motivation towards the development of international human rights
law were the events leading up to and during the Second World War. During this time, many
atrocities were carried out under the full authority of domestic law. Id.
9. UDHR, supra note 3.
10. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, 36 U.N. GOAR Supp. (No.
51) at 171, U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1981) [hereinafter Declaration].
11. Draft Proclamation of the Conference Proposed by the Delegation of Iran -
Proclamation of Teheran, International Conference on Human Rights, -- U.N. ESCOR at 2,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 32/L.28 (1968) [hereinafter Proclamation of Teheran].
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Paul Sieghart points out, is that:
To the extent of those obligations, the strict
doctrine of national sovereignty has been cut
down in two crucial respects. First, how a State
treats its own subjects is now the legitimate
concern of international law. Secondly, there is
now a superior international standard, established
by common consent, which may be used for
judging the domestic laws and the actual conduct
of sovereign States within their own territory and
in the exercise of their internal jurisdictions .
12
Within the context of the development of international
human rights law, the principle of equality or non-discrimina-
tion is one of the norms most widely found in international
human rights instruments. All of the major human rights
treaties, and many of the declarations, contain a provision
importing this principle. The Charter of the United Nations
itself includes as two of its major goals the principle of equal
rights of peoples and the promotion and encouragement of
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.13 Several
authors agree that this principle now constitutes a norm of
customary international law at least with respect to the
grounds of race and sex. 4
12. SiEGHART, supra note 7, at 15.
13. The purposes of the United Nations are:
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle
of equal rights and self-determination of the peoples, and to take other appropriate
measures to strengthen universal peace.
3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural or' humanitarian character, and in promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.
U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2, 3.
14. See generally A. BAYEFSKY, The Principle of Equality or Non-Discrimination In
International Law: Implications For Equality Rights In The Charter, in RIGHTING THE
BALANCE: CANADAS NEW EOUALrrY RIGHTS 117, 123-25 (L Smith ed. 1986); B.G.
[Vol. VII
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The importance which has been given to this principle
by the United Nations since its inception, and by the world
community in general, can be seen both in the frequency with
which the principle is included, and the prominence it is given,
in each instrument. For example, in the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, Article 2 states: "[e]veryone is entitled
to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin; property, birth or other status." 5 Similarly, the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 2(1)
states:
Each State Party to the present Covenant
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present
Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin,
property birth or other status.16
RAMcHARAN, EQUALITY AND NONDISCRIMINATION, THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 246, 249 (L. Henkin ed. 1981) [hereinafter
RAMCHARAN]; For a general history of the development of the principle of equality or non-
discrimination see I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 578-80 (2d. ed.
1973); RAMCHARAN, supra at 247-50.
15. See UDHR, supra, note 3. See also UDHR, supra note 3, art. 7.
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination
to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection
against discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any
incitement to such discrimination.
Id. at 72, 73.
16. See ICCPR, supra note 4, at 53. The Covenant was adopted and ratified on Dec.
16, 1966. See also arts. 3 and 26:
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the
equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all.civil and political
rights set forth in the present Covenant.
26. All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law
shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and
effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
1989]
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In addition, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, Article 2(2) states: "[t]he States
Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that
the rights enunciated in: the present Covenant will be exer-
cised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status." 7 Similar provisions are
contained in: The International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD); i8 The
Convention (No. 111) concerning Discrimination in Respect of
Employment and Occupation;19 the Convention Against
Discrimination in Education;' ° the Convention on the Elimin-
ation of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDW);21 and so forth.'
social origin, property, birth or other status.
Id.
17. See ICESCR, supra note 5, at 49-50. The Covenant was adopted and ratified on
Dec. 16, 1966. See also arts. 2(3) and 3:
2. (3) Developing countries, with due regard to human rights and their
national economy, may determine to what extent they would guarantee
the economic rights recognized in the present Covenant to non-nationals.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenent undertake to ensure the
equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social
and cultural rights set forth in the present Covenant.
Id.
18. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, G.A. Res. 2106A (XX), 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 47, U.N. Doc
A/6014 (1966) adopted by the General Assembly on December 21, 1965. Entered into force
on January 4, 1969 [hereinafter ICERD]. See also arts. 1 and 2.
19. International Labour Office, Official Bulletin. Vol. XLI (1958) No. 2 at 72.
Adopted by the General Conference of the International Labour Organization at its forty-
second session on June 25, 1958. Entered into force on June 15, 1960. See articles 1, 2, 4
and 5.
20. See United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, General
Conference, Eleventh session (30th mtg.) at 119 (1960) (entered into force on May 22, 1962)
[hereinafter The Convention Against Discrimination in Education]. See Articles 1, 2, 3, and
4.
21. G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, U.N. Doc A/34/46 (1979)
[hereinafter CEDW]. Adopted by the General Assembly on December 18, 1979 (Res.
34/180). Entered into force on September 3, 1981. See arts. 1, 2, 4, 7 and 8.
22. Declaration, supra note 10, at 171-72 (arts. 2, 3, 4, 5) and the Proclamation of
Teheran, supra note 11, art. 1.
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An examination of the individual provisions listed above
will show that, although the wording of the February, 1988
Article 4 in the draft Convention on the Rights of the Child
was similar to that in several other international human rights
instruments, particularly, the ICCPR and the ICESCR, it was
also unique in several ways. First, the list of grounds were,
and remain in the new Article 2, different between the first
and second subsections of the Article. This issue is discussed
below in connection with the question of the sufficiency of the
included grounds.'
Second, both the old draft Article 4 and the new
Article 2 are what one author has called a subordinate clause
rather than an autonomous one.24 Although all of the similar
clauses in the major international human rights instruments
position the clause so that it governs all of the rights con-
tained in the instrument, Article 26 of the ICCPR is structured
in such a way that it is an autonomous norm and stands on its
own: "[a]ll persons are equal before the law and are entitled
without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law."
The draft Convention here, like the majority of other instru-
ments, contains a subordinate clause which, although it can
have no independent existence, qualifies all of the other
substantive provisions as if it were a part of each one.
Finally, both versions of the draft Article extend the
prohibition of discrimination to include sources of possible
discrimination due to attributes of the child's parents, legal
guardians or family members, rather than the child himself.
Thus, the Article recognizes both the special status and needs
of children, due to their very dependency, and at the same
time their right to many of the same basic human rights and
fundamental freedoms already recognized for adults.
The question of whether children are included in the
rights guaranteed in other international human rights instru-
ments is not an easy one to solve. Although under some
23. See infra notes 26-38 and accompanying text.
24. BAYEFSKY, supra note 14, at 119.
1989]
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circumstances, children require special protection due to their
unique interests, there is not always sufficient justification to
treat children differently from adults at all times. It is pos-
sible that a certain "ghettoization" of children's issues might
result from a restriction of the rights of children to only one
Convention.2'
11. DISTINCTION vs. DISCRIMINATION
Four particular concerns arose from an examination of
the wording of the February, 1988 Article 4 of the draft
Convention in the context of the existing international human
rights law discussed above. First, the wording appeared in
somewhat different form from many of the other international
human rights instruments, such as the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International
Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination and the Convention for the Elimination of Dis-
crimination Against Women. At the same time, it was similar
to others, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
due to its use of the word "distinction" rather than the term
"discrimination."
At first glance, the word "distinction" appears broader
25. One of the potential difficulties with the creation of such a separate convention on
the Right of the Child is that this might, by implication, result in the exclusion of children
from the purview of the already existing human rights instruments, although this concern is
to some extent addressed by the inclusion of article 41. See Schweitzer, A Children's Rights
Convention --- What Is The United Nations Accomplishing? in THE FAMILY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: SOME EMERGING PROBLEMS --- THIRD SOKOL COLLOQUIUM 115, 126-
33 (R. Lillich ed. 1981). What is perhaps more likely is a "fragmentation" of children's rights
resulting in a lack of clarity and confusion within States as to the extent of their obligations.
In this context, as an aside, since many Articles contained in the draft Convention are
restatements and expansions of preexisting rights under other instruments, it might be useful
to consider explicitly including a provision acknowledging the rights of children to share in
the protection of other human rights instruments or perhaps to include a statement to this
effect in Article 41. By the use of similar wording to that of several existing international
human rights instruments, the draft Convention adopts much of the law that has already
developed in this area particularly with regard to the non-discrimination clause which has
received so much attention in the context of other similar instruments.
[Vol. VIU
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in its potential application then the word "discrimination."
While an anti-discrimination clause such as that contained in
the February draft appeared laudable in the extent of its
reach, a close examination raises the concern that the actual
choice of wording in this clause might well make it unwork-
able. Most law, both domestic and international, exists by the
very fact of creating some distinctions between groups of
people or between situations or individuals. In some cases,
distinctions are justifiable' and may even be deliberately made
in order to ameliorate certain disadvantages. As written, it
appeared that this earlier clause could be taken to prohibit all
distinctions of any sort, whereas obviously the intention of this
clause was to permit some "positive" distinctions while disal-
lowing other "negative" ones.
This concern has been raised before and, indeed, some
discussion of the difference in the meanings of these two
terms was entered into during the process leading up to the
adoption of the two International Covenants. As B.G. Ram-
charan points out in his report of the events, some delegates
preferred the word "discrimination" because they felt this word
reflected the fact that some distinctions were justifiable and,
in cases of affirmative action, even desirabL=. Other delegates
were concerned that the utilization of the word "discrimin-
ation" might allow States to justify distinctions on the basis
that groups were not "similarly situated" as there was no
generally accepted definition of the word in the international
sphere. They preferred the word "distinction" as it was used
in many other texts and constitutions, such as the French
Constitution. Each word was felt by one group of delegates
to give a higher degree of protection. In the final version of
the Covenants, however, it appears that both terms were used
interchangeably even within different articles of the same
Covenant, although in the clause closest to that of the draft
26. See SIEGHART, supra note 7, at 17-18; RAMCHARAN, supra note 14, at 258; A.H.
ROBERTSON, HuMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 108 (2d ed. 1977); CHARLES ALEXANDRE Kiss, Le
Concept d'egalite: definition et earience, 27 LES CAHIERS DE DROrr 145, 149 (1986).
1989]
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Convention, the ICCPR used the word "distinction," while the
ICESCR used the word "discrimination. 27
The term "distinction" is not affirmatively defined in any
of the Conventions, although some explanation is given as to
what does not constitute a distinction. Only four of the
Conventions actually define the term "discrimination."' Most
authors agree, however, that both terms are to be interpreted
to exclude arbitrary or unjust distinctions or discrimination.29
Therefore, it is possible that the terms distinction and dis-
crimination are truly interchangeable in the field of interna-
tional human rights law.
However, it is arguable that there is a subtle difference
between the definitions of the two words in international law.
27. See generally RAMCHARAN, supra note 14, at 258-61.
28. The ICERD, supra note 18, states in Article 1:
In this Convention, the term 'racial discrimination' shall mean any
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour,
descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an
equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political,
economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.
Id. The CEDW, supra note 21, states in Article 1:
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term 'discrimination
against women' shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made
on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of nullifying the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital
status on the basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil, or
any other field.
Id The Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment, supra note 19, states
at Article 1(a):
For the purpose of this Convention the term 'discrimination' includes
(a) Any distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of race,
colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin,
which has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or
treatment in employment or occupation.
The Convention against Discrimination in Education, supra note 20, at 119:
For the purpose of this Convention, the term 'discrimination' includes any
distinction, exclusion, limitation or preference which, being based on race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, economic condition or birth, has the purpose or effect of
nullifying or impairing equality of treatment in education and in particular
Id
29. See BROWNLIE, supra note 14, at 579; RAMCHARAN, supra note 14, at 259-61;
BAYEFSKY, supra note 14, at 119.
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First, the two are not synonymous either within the confines
of the English language generally or within some domestic
human rights law. Second, although all of the international
instruments referred to above maintain consistency by using
"sans distinction aucune" in the French document for the
English "without distinction of any kind" and "sans discrimina-
tion aucune" for "without discrimination of any kind," a
dichotomy of usage has previously been examined in the
context of the European Court of Human Rights. Specifically,
Article 14 of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, uses the term
"without discrimination" in English and "sans distinction
aucune" in French. In interpreting this article, the European
Court of Human Rights found that:
In spite of the very general wording of the
French version ("sans distinction aucune"), Article
14 does not forbid every difference in treatment
in the exercise of the rights and freedoms
recognized. This version must be read in the
light of the more restrictive text of the English
version ("without discrimination").31
The Court also found that certain legal distinctions were
indeed the only means to correct factual inequalities. This
decision would suggest that there may well be some difference
in meaning between the two terms.
Thus, the concern expressed in connection with the
choice of the word "distinction" in the Covenants, that it was
the word chosen in many constitutions, including the French
Constitution, may in reality be a much stronger argument in
relation to a more historical definition of the word "distinction"
30. EUROPEAN COMMIS.SION OF HUMAN RIGHiS DOCUMENTS AND DECISIONS 1955-1957
14-15, 36 (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1959).
31. Case, Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education
in Belgium (merits), 6 EUR. CT. H.R. (ser. A) (1968).
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in both French and English. It is interesting to compare the
nondiscrimination provision in the recent Canadian Constitu-
tion, which uses the word "discrimination" in both the English
and French versions. 2
In this regard, it appears a positive change that the
December, 1988 version of this Article no longer uses the
term "distinction" but rather prohibits "discrimination" under
both subsections.3
111. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Although there remains a concern that the use of the
word "discrimination" may allow States to justify distinctions on
the basis that groups are not "similarly situated," this danger
does not seem as real as the concern that the use of the term
"distinction," without further definition, might have actually
discouraged States from creating short-term distinctions in
order to remedy historical disadvantage, such as by affirmative
action. Several authors have previously examined what
32. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act of 1982,
was enacted by Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, ch.11, § 155. Section 15
of the Charter, the equality rights section, took effect three years later on April 17, 1985.
CONsMTrnON Acr part I, § 15(1)(2). The three year delay was planned to allow provincial
and federal governments to review legislation and make any necessary changes to bring
statutory law into compliance with the equality rights section. Section 15 of the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms reads:
(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right
to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimina-
tion, and in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or
ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age, or mental or physical disability.
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has
as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals
or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national
or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
The French version substitutes the words "without discrimination" for.
15(1) La loi ne fait acception de personne et s'applique egalement a tous,
et tous ont droit a a meme protection at au meme benefice de la loi,
independamment de toute discrimination, notamment des discriminations
fondees sur ....
Id
33. Worldng Group Report, supra note 1.
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constitutes a differentiation under international law.' Most
agree that a differentiation must have'an objective and
reasonable justification, and that the means chosen must be
proportionate to the justification.
It is generally recognized that the principle of equality
or non-discrimination does not require strict equality of
treatment for all persons, because the concept of human rights
recognizes that human beings, although belonging to a com-
mon heritage, are inherently unique. It is basic to the principle
of equality that equal treatment of persons who are not
similarly situated, and therefore not in equal circumstances,
can often perpetuate inequality rather than creating equality.
In order to achieve true equality in fact, and to ensure
that there is no abuse, people must be treated differently
within certain limitations. A blanket prohibition of distinctions
could well result in a situation where a State is not allowed
to make distinctions between citizens and aliens, although all
States do, and this is basic to the concept of statehood.
Many international human rights instruments containing
a prohibition of discrimination or-distinction also contain a
clause specifically allowing positive measures to be taken in
favor of disadvantaged groups or so-called affirmative action
provisions. Many such clauses also list specific examples of
distinctions which do not constitute discrimination for the
purposes of the document.' These special' measures, or
affirmative action, must be undertaken only to correct the
demonstrable effects of historical discrimination or inequality
and must be: temporary; cease when specific, stated objectives
are attained; and not in their effect maintain unequal or
34. See generally, BROWNuE, supra note 14, at 379; BAYEFSKY, supra note 14 at 121-25.
35. See, eg, ICERD, supra note 18, art. 1(4):
1(4). Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate
advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring
such protection as may be necessary in order to ensure such groups or
individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental
freedoms shall not be deemed racial discrimination ....
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separate standards.' A clause of this type included in the
draft Convention on the Rights of the Child would offer added
flexibility to measures taken by States to effect the Convention
and would assist in the achievement of the long-term goal of
equal opportunity for the world's children.
IV. THE DISABLED CHILD
A further concern raised by draft Article 4 was the
extent of the list of grounds. A comparison of the list of
grounds under the other international human rights instru-
ments showed that it was fairly complete. However, it was
noticeable that the only ground which appeared to be missing
from Article 4(1) was physical and mental disability. Although
the list of grounds contained in the draft Article 4 was open-
ended and remains unchanged in the new Article 2, the
specific protection for disabled children was included in the
draft Convention at Article 12, now Article 23. An inclusion
here in the list of prohibited grounds of discrimination which
would serve to strengthen the rights of disabled children. It
is interesting to note that this ground has now been added to
the new Article 2, while three other grounds, namely family
status, cultural beliefs or practices and educational attainment,
have been removed from the earlier draft Article.
Again, perhaps the reason that disability had not
hitherto been included here stemmed from the use of the
word "distinction" instead of "discrimination" in Article 4, as
the prohibition of discrimination on this ground would be
more reasonable for a state, in that it would be better able to
understand and meet its obligations. A prohibition of distinc-
tion on this ground might well discourage a state from develo-
ping specialized programs to meet the needs of disabled
children.
36. ICERD, supra note 18, arts. 1(4) and 2(2) and the CEDW, supra note 21, art. 4(1).
[VOL VII
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V. CHILDREN VS. FAMIuEs
The first section of both versions of this draft Article
extend protection to attributes concerning the child's parents
and/or legal guardians. The second section adds the words "or
other family members." The addition of this further extension
to the first subsection would not create major additional
burdens and might, by its consistency, avoid situations where
another family member is temporarily in charge of the child
and the child is subject to discrimination.
Under the second part of the old Article 4 and the new
Article 2, there appears to be less extensive protection for the
rights of children than for their rights concerning their rela-
tives. While it is understandable to some extent that children
cannot always be protected from punishment due to their own
activities, and that adults will have more extensive rights with
regard to the holding of opinions and so on, the draft Con-
vention by its terms also does apply to children up until the
age of 18. All children, and certainly a 17 or 18-year-old,
should have the same protection from punishment and
discrimination based on their own status, expressed opinions
and beliefs as they do from that based on those of their
relatives. Perhaps this clause should be divided into two parts
for greater clarity.
VI. CONCLUSION
Several changes could be made to the new draft of
Article 2 in order to clarify and strengthen its effectiveness. 37
37. Recommendations suggested for changes to the earlier draft Article 4 (as published
in C. COHEN. Independent Commentary: United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
in DEFENSE FOR CHILDREN INTERNATMONAL (C. Cohen ed. 1988)) were accommodated in
part by the new version of the draft article. The earlier recommendations, for the sake of
comparison, were as follows:
1. The States Parties to the present Convention shall respect and extend
all the rights set forth in this Convention to each child in their territories
without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child's or his
parent's or legal guardian's or other family member's race, colour, s,
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The recommendations made above can be summarized in the
following version:
1. States Parties shall respect and ensure the
rights set forth in this Convention to each child
within their jurisdiction without discrimination of
any kind, irrespective of the child's or his or her
parent's or legal guardian's or family member's
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin,
property, disability, birth, or other status.
2. States Parties shall take all appropriate
measures to ensure that the child is protected
against all forms of discrimination or punishment
on the basis of the status, activities, expressed
opinions, or beliefs of the child's parents, legal
guardians, or family members and on the basis
of the status, expressed opinions, or beliefs of the
child.
3. This article shall not preclude any law, program
or activity that has as its object the amelioration of
conditions of disadvantaged groups, including those
dis- advantaged due to one of the grounds listed in
subsection 1, provided that these special measures
are temporary, cease when specific, stated objectives
are attained and do not in their effect maintain
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
family status, ethnic origin, cultural beliefs or practices, property,
educational attainment, birth, mental or physical disability, or any other
basis whatever.
2. States Parties to the present Convention shall take all appropriate
measures to ensure that the child is protected against all forms of
discrimination or punishment on the basis of status, activities, expressed
opinions, or beliefs of the Child's parents, legal guardians, or other family




unequal or separate standards.
Achieving the ideal balance is not an easy task. As one
author has noted: "[i]n formulating a children's convention, the
United Nations' most difficult task will be determining how
to provide children with both the care and protection required
by childhood and the broadest range of freedom and rights
compatible with the physical, intellectual and social conditions
of childhood."'  The task is much more difficult when the
goal is to embody this blueprint for the future within one
document intended to last for all time. The document's
message must apply over the wide variety of cultural, political
and social backgrounds and the vast changes and challenges
that each child faces during the first 18 years of life.
38. SCHWErrZER, supra note 25, at 122.
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